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IMPLEMENTING WASHINGTON'S ERA:
PROBLEMS WITH WHOLESALE
LEGISLATIVE REVISION
Linda H. Dybwad*
In November 1972, the people of the State of Washington ap-
proved an equal rights amendment to the Constitution of the State of
Washington' which provides:
§ I. Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be
denied or abridged on account of sex.
§ 2. The Legislature shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Chapter 154 of the Washington Session Laws of the 1973 First Ex-
traordinary Session 2 implements that constitutional amendment and
represents an attempt by the Legislature to conform many of the
state's statutes to the principles of equal rights between the sexes.
Chapter 154 amends 120 separate sections of the Revised Code of
Washington and repeals four sections. Consequently, it spans a wide
variety of topics that must be grouped at least roughly by subject
matter in order to examine the potential effect of the equalization
process. By far the greatest number of the revised statutes touch upon
the marital or family relationship in some manner. These changes seek
to equalize treatment of spouses by extending to the wife many rights
formerly available only to the husband, as well as extending to hus-
bands some benefits previously reserved only to wives. The wife is also
now subject to several duties formerly imposed only on the husband.
Some amendments remove restrictions on the employment of women; :d
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A.. California State
College at Los Angeles, 1967; J. D., University of California, Los Angeles, 1970.
1. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI. House Joint Resolution 61 parallels the proposed
Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, H.J. RES. 208,
92d CONG. 1st SEss. ( 1971).
2. Ch. 154, [ 1973] Wash. Laws 1st Ex.Sess. [hereinafter cited as ch. 154].
3. Ch. 154, § 20. amending WASH. REV. CODE § 15.24.086 (1963); § 21, amending
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.18.010 (Supp. 1972); § 60. amending WASH. REV. CODE §
41.08.040 (1963); § 80. amending WASH. REV. CODE § 43.22.160 (1963); § 81, amending
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.22.170 (1963); § 82, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 43.22.260
(1963); § 83, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 43.22.270 (Supp. 1972); § 84, amending
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.22.280 (1963); § 85, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 43.51.570
(1963); § 86, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 43.78.150 (1963); § 89, amending WASH.
REV. CODE § 49.24,080 (1963); § 90, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 49.24.110 (1963);
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others amend criminal laws concerning sex related crimes to include
protection for men. All women are now members of the Washington
State Militia and may receive military training at the University of
Washington. "' The various amendments are susceptible of several gen-
eral criticisms.
Some of the changes made by Chapter 154 are simply unnecessary.
R.C.W. § 1.12.050 provides that "words importing the masculine
gender may be extended to females also."" In light of this general
principle of statutory construction, it is difficult to believe that either
the courts or the agencies responsible for the administration of the
pre-revision statutes would have had difficulty reading the male pron-
ouns to include females. Consequently, except for the psychological
value of statutes drafted to be sex neutral, these amendments will have
little impact.
Also, the drafters have failed to be consistent in the selection of
words in the amending process. For instance, the word "widow" was
often amended to "widow or widower,"'7 but in other revisions was
changed to "surviving spouse."8 Such technical inconsistencies will
make no practical difference in the interpretation of the law. How-
ever, to the reader of the entire bill, they convey an impression that
the revisions were made mindlessly and mechanically-certainly a
dangerous and unwise approach.
Most importantly, the revisions contained in Chapter 154 reflect a
failure to recognize potential alternatives for legislative revision in the
context of the equal rights amendment. There is no single way to ef-
fect equalization; benefits may be extended to the sex not previously
§ 100. atmending WASH. REV. CODE § 67.14.040 (1963): § 114. amending WASH. REV.
CODE § 78.40.606 (1963): § 121(4), amending WASH. REV. CODE § 49.28.070 (1963).
4. Ch. 154, §§ 122-29. amending WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.79.010-.080 (1963).
5. Ch. 154. § 47. amending WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.30.150 (1963); § 55. amend-
ing WASH. REV. CODE § 38.04.030 (Supp. 1972): § 56. atnending WASH. REV. CODE
§ 38.20.010 (Supp. 1972): § 57. amending WASH. REV. CODE § 38.44.010 (1963);
§ 58. amending WASH. REV. CODE § 38.52.030 (Supp. 1972): § 59. amending
WASH. REV. CODE § 38.52.300 (1963).
6. Thus, a change such as ch. 154, § 15, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 6.16.090
(1963) which states: "'as used in this section the masculine shall apply also to the
feminine," is completely unnecessary. Both the courts and the agencies responsible
for administration of these laws would have no difficulty reading the masculine to
include the feminine with or without the amendment.
7. See, e.g., ch. 154. § 62. amending WASH. REV. CODE § 41.16.100 (1963).
8. See, e.g., ch. 154, § 78. amending WASH. REV. CODE § 41.44.170 (1963).
Since the surviving spouse. in the absence of state authorized homosexual marriage.
will be a widow or widower. there is probably no difference in result.
572
Vol. 49: 571, 1974
Washington's ERA
covered or withdrawn entirely. A third possibility lies in examining the
entire conceptual framework of a statute and reworking it to achieve
equality by eliminating underlying sex role stereotypes.
This article will attempt to illustrate the legislative choices available
in implementing the equal rights amendment by evaluating the many
revisions contained in Chapter 154 in terms of equal rights principles
and the policies underlying the criminal, family and employment pro-
visions it amends.
I. THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
The equal rights amendment clearly establishes, as a principle of
constitutional law,-' the inherent equality of males and females. It re-
quires, therefore, that men and women be treated identically in terms
of their legal rights and responsibilities. In the past men and women
have often been treated differently by statute because large numbers
of either sex share a certain characteristic. For instance, women gen-
erally are of smaller physical stature than men and in some historic
contexts were unable to protect themselves from exploitation by em-
ployers. Hence, legislators protected women, as a group, by passing
limitations on the weights they could be required to lift while em-
ployed. It is apparent that such statutes work a real hardship on indi-
vidual members of the group who do not share the characteristic, for
example the 200-pound woman, or the union of women that now has
sufficient bargaining power to gain favorable treatment. In addition,
as the overall characteristics of the sex group change, the original
statute will discriminate against the entire group by retaining in the
law a sex role, or sex stereotype, that is merely reflective of the be-
havior or circumstances of large numbers of the sex group at some
time in the past.
9. The psychological impact of the amendment as a part of the document embody-
ing what is believed to contain the most sacred of individual and human rights cannot
be underestimated. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amend-
inent: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE LJ. 871, 886
(1971). an excellent analysis of the theory and probable operation of the federal
equal rights amendment. See also Equal Rights for Women: A Symposium on the
Proposed Constitutional Amnendmnent, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 215(1971);
Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amend-
ment? 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499 (1971); Rawalt, E.qual Justice for Women-Update
the Constitution, 17 N.Y.L.F. 528 (197 1).
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The equal rights mandate requires that legislators avoid the easy
classification on the basis of sex.'(' Lawmakers may not determine that
large numbers of either sex generally share a characteristic and then
legislate on that basis. Instead, they must focus precisely on the
problem to be corrected, for example, that workers of small stature
are being compelled to lift weights in excess of healthful limits, and
draft the statute in those terms, not in terms of sex.
If this test is applied, it is readily apparent that sex cannot be a
proper basis for classification except where a statute concerns a char-
acteristic shared by all females and no males, or all males and no
females. This is a narrow test. A perfect protototype of such legisla-
tion would concern actual anatomical differences between men and
women; a law regulating sperm donors or wet nurses.II However, laws
that on their face address only general physical differences between
the sexes fail to meet the requirements of the equal rights amendment.
For example, a statute forbidding women to lift in excess of twenty-
five pounds on the job could not meet the test. While it is gen-
erally true that men are able to lift heavier weights than women, many
women can and do lift such weights with no ill effects. The ability to
lift specific weights comfortably depends on individual stature and
strength, not sex. ' 2
10. Following passage of the equal rights amendment, classification on the basis
of sex will almost always be an over inclusive classification. Historically. sex has been
a permissible basis for classification. See Goesaert v. Cleary. 335 U.S. 464 (1948):
Muller v. Oregon. 208 U.S. 412 (1908): Bradwell v. Illinois. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1872). Although the Supreme Court recently invalidated a sex classification on the
ground that it was arbitrary (see Reed v. Reed. 404 U.S. 71 (1971)). a majority of
the court has to date failed to declare sex a "suspect- classification which Would result
in placing the burden ofiustifying the classification on the state. Cjf Sail'er Inn. Inc. v.
Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d I. 485 P.2d 529 (1971). But see Frontiero v. Richardson. 411 U.S.
667 (1973) (Brennan..I.J.. concurring).
I1. But. believe it or not, even anatomical differences between men and women may
be so minimized in the future that they will not furnish a basis for different legislative
treatment. See generally, Gorney, The New Biology and the Future of Matt, 15
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 273 (1968). There are, for instance. "reports of Chinese men
functioning in past centuries as wet nurses." and "'lti heoretically. there seems to be
no reason why with proper preparation a pregnancy could not be gestated in a man's
abdomen and thrive to term, in a transplanted uterus or other suitable spot, thereupon
being delivered by Caesarian section into the affectionate arms of a nursing father."
hi. at 284.
12. In Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company. 416 F.2d 711. 717-18 (7th Cir. 1969).
the court stated:
If anything is certain in this controversial area, it is that there is no general
agreement as to what is a maximum permissible weight which can be safely lifted
by women in the course of their employment. The states which have limits vary
considerably. Most of the state limits were enacted many years ago and most.
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It is apparent, then, that few of the existing laws differentiating
between males and females can withstand application of the amend-
ment. Yet, the very importance of certain male-female relationships,
such as marriage, as well as the influence of traditional sex roles, have
combined to fill the statute books with laws benefiting or penalizing
either men or women.
Revisors of these statutes must recognize, however, that the princi-
ples of the equal rights amendment do not operate in a vacuum. The
underlying policies of each statute should be considered carefully in
deciding how, in terms of its probable effect, the equal rights amend-
ment should be applied. Once the underlying policy of a statute is
understood, the appropriate method of revision-extending the
statute to both sexes, repealing the statute, or completely overhauling
the statute-should be selected; the choice should be based on both
equal rights principles and the policies and assumptions underlying
the particular law involved.
A threshold question is whether the revisions required by equal
rights should be used as an opportunity for reform in the law not di-
rectly related to equal rights. Since we have to get the materials out
and think about them anyway, it is only logical to do the entire job of
reform. However, equalization without reform is preferable to no
equalization, and where the reform itself entails controversial, nonre-
lated issues, equalization is likely to be defeated by objections that are
not relevant to sex related reform.' 3
if not all, would be considered clearly unreasonable in light of the average physical
development, strength and stamina of most modern American women who partici-
pate in the industrial work force. Almost all state limits are below the 33 to 44.1
pounds recommended by an investigatory committee of the International Labor
Organization (I.L.O.) in March, 1964. Even those limits were rejected by the
I.L.O. and the provision finally adopted in I.L.O. Convention No. 127 (June 28,
1967) simply states that no worker should transport loads "which, by reason of
its weight is likely to jeopardize his health or safety" and that the maximum
weight of loads for women "shall be substantially less than that permitted for
adult male workers." At the same time, Recommendation 127 was adopted stating
that the maximum load for an adult male should be 55 kg. or 121 pounds. While
there was no agreement as to a maximum load for women, the I.L.O. experts
individually suggested limits ranging from 60.5 to 76.9 pounds, virtually twice
the limit agreed to by the court below.
13. Ironically, and by way of illustration, the legislative history of the sex dis-
crimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2(a)(I) & 2000e-2(e) (1970), indicates that they were introduced by
southern Senators in an attempt to defeat the antiracial discrimination portions of
the Bill. L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 103-06
(1969) [hereinafter cited as L. KANOWITZ].
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In addition, one important aim of the equal rights amendment
should be to aid in breaking down stylized sex roles that handicap
both men and women in their relationships with each other and with
society.' 4 To further this aim, and with it true equality for women,
revisors of legislation should make every effort to discern the under-
lying sex roles that may have influenced the enactment and develop-
ment of existing laws and take care to avoid their reappearance in the
revision.
II. THE PRIVACY QUALIFICATION
One of the revisions contained in Chapter 154 is a good illustration
of the operation of equal rights principles in the context of other indi-
vidual constitutionally protected rights. Section 53 provides that "'no
member of one sex under arrest shall be confined in the same cell or
apartment of the city jail or prison, with any member of the other sex
whatever."' 15 This amendment represents a change in wording only,
since the statute formerly prohibited confining male and female pris-
oners together. However, both versions recognize and respect the con-
stitutional right to privacy.
The Supreme Court has recognized an individual right to privacy
inherent in several provisions of the United States Constitution. That
right already has been interpreted as broad enough to preclude state
interference with the individual decision to use contraceptives,'"1 to
possess pornographic literature in the home, 17 and to have an abortion. 18
14. Sex roles have a strong influence in our society and therefore in our laws.
For a discussion of many of the modern sex role influences, see Comment. 4 Little
Dearer Than His Horse: Legal Stereotvpe.s and the Feminine Per.%onality, 6 HARV.
Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 260 (1971). See generally K. MHLETT. SEXUAL POLI-
TICS (1969) [hereinafter cited as K. MILLETTI. Female stereotypes have been dis-
approved as a basis for employment discrimination under the sex discrimination
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(I)
& 2000e-2(e) (1970). See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385
(5th Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950(1971).
15. Ch. 154. § 53. anending WAsH. REV. CODE § 35.66.050(1963).
16. The Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). would not per-
mit the state to forbid the use of contraceptives by married persons because of the
incursion it represented into the privacy of the marital refationship. In Eisenstadt v.
Baird. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). the Court extended its decision to unmarried persons.
stating that laws could not properly distinguish between these classifications in the case
of contraceptives.
17. Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
18. Roev. Wade. 410U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton. 410U.S. 179(1973).
576
Vol. 49: 571, 1974
Washington's ERA
Although the exact parameters of the constitutional right to privacy
have not been completely delineated, it, of course, will operate in
conjunction with equal rights amendment concepts, and" [i] n general it
can be said . . . that the privacy concept is applicable primarily in
situations which involve disrobing, sleeping, or performing personal
bodily functions in the presence of the other sex."" : Since the landmark
privacy decisions have emphasized the right of personal choice in in-
timate matters of human sexuality, it is probable that the equal rights
amendment will not make undesirable incursions into personal privacy.
III. FAMILY LAW
More than sixty sections of Chapter 154 amend various laws that in
some way concern the rights and responsibilities of family members.
These amendments have equalized this plethora of laws by systemati-
cally extending the statutory right or benefit to the sex not previously
covered,20 although in a few instances the right in question has been
withdrawn rather than extended.2'
It is not surprising that much amending of laws dealing with the
family was required. The importance of the family relationship to so-
ciety has resulted in a multitude of legislative actions over the years
that generally reflect the historic position of the woman in the family
19. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Con-
stitttional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L. 871, 901 (1971).
20. E.g., mothers as well as fathers, may now maintain an action for the personal
injury, wrongful death or seduction of a child. Ch. 154, § 4, amending WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.24.010 (Supp. 1972); § 5, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.100
A mother may sign a driver's license application for a minor child and appear with
the child at a revocation hearing. Ch. 154, § 87, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.100
(Supp. 1972); § 88, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.322 (1963). The statutory
pension funds have been extended to cover surviving spouses rather than just widows.
See, e.g., ch. 154, § 61. amending WASH. REV. CODE § 41.16.010(1963); § 62, amending
WASH. REV. CODE § 41.16.100 (1963); § 63, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 41.16.120
(1963); § 64, anending WASH. REV. CODE § 41.16.140 (1963); § 65, amending WASH.
REV. CODE § 41.16.150 (1963); § 66, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 41.16.160 (1963);
§ 67, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 41.16.170(1963); § 68, amendingWASH. REv. CODE §
41.16.230 (1963); § 69, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 41.18.010 (1963); § 70,
amending WASH. REV. CODE § 41.18.040 (1963); § 71, amending WASH. REV. CODE §
41.16.223 (1963); § 69, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 41.18.010 (1963); § 70,
acnending WASH. REV. CODE § 41.18.100 (1963); § 74, amending WASH. REV. CODE §
41.24.160 (1963); § 75, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 41.24.180 (1963).
21. The sections permitting a woman to bring an action for her own seduction or
for false accusation of sex crimes were repealed. Ch. 154, § 121(1), repealing WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.24.030 (Supp. 1972); § 121(2), repealing WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.120
(1963).
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relationship as deferential to male management and protection. Such
legally imposed deference is inconsistent with the equal rights amend-
ment.
At common law a married woman was a legal nonentity. As a result
of the doctrine of coverture, or unity of husband and wife, a married
woman incurred both substantive and procedural disabilities..2 2 She
could not contract, sue or be sued, or manage her lands or chattels.
This legal disability produced, in time, at least three major groups of
laws that must be squared with the equal rights amendment. First,
there are a series of laws permitting the father, but not the mother, to
manage the rights and accept the responsibilities of the minor children
of the family. 3 Second, some laws extend benefits to women or
female children, but not to their male counterparts, on the theory that
women were the only sex in need of support or protection.2 4 Finally,
there is a group of laws which may generally be referred to as married
women's laws.2 5 These laws essentially fall into two categories: those
laws that represent piecemeal removal over the years of the disabilities
of married women;2"5 and those that still reflect coverture and prevent
the wife from acting independently.2 7
The manner in which Chapter 154 equalized these laws is subject
to two major criticisms. There are several substantive inconsistencies
in the manner chosen for equalization.2 8 In addition, the extension of
22. L. KANOWITZ. supra note 13. at 35-40. The unmarried woman, however, was
in a better legal, if not social, position.
23. /-.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (Supp. 1972). giving the father the right to
bring an action for the death or injury of a minor child.
24. These are primarily survivor's benefits from pension funds. See note 62 infra.
25. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.170 (1963). giving married women the right
to contract.
26. 1.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.3 10 (1963), permitting a married woman to
transfer and receive the profits of stock in her own name without her husband's
consent.
27. I-.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 79.48.130 (Supp. 1972). which allowed a married
woman to apply for state lands under the Carey Act only if she was the head of a fam-
ily. This disability has been removed by ch. 154. § 115.
See also WASH. REV. CODE § 6.12.040 (1963) (allowing the husband to select real
property for purposes of homestead). The wife could select only if she was the head
of a family or if the husband was absent.
28. The general principle for revision in the bill. as noted above, was to extend
rights and benefits to the sex not previously covered. However. in some instances, the
right was extended in one section, and withdrawn in another section dealing with a
similar topic. For instance, the law permitting a personal injury cause of action to
survive after death was amended to allow dependent brothers to share in the pro-
ceeds of the cause of action regardless of age. Ch. 154 § 3. amending WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.20.060 (1963). Previously, proceeds could be shared by all dependent sis-
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statutory rights to the sex not previously covered represents in several
instances a failure to consider adequately the policy underlying the
law being equalized, as well as the policy of a companion statute that
previously had been revised to conform to equal rights principles.
A. Criminal Nonsupport
The husband and wife have always been jointly and severally re-
sponsible for the expenses of the family and. the education of chil-
dren.29 Similarly, either parent has always been criminally liable for
failure to support or for abandonment of a minor child. 30 However, in
the past only the husband was criminally liable for desertion or nonsup-
port of his wife.3 '
The Section penalizing nonsupport of a wife has now been amended
to provide:32
(1) Every person who: ... (c) Has sufficient ability to provide for sup-
port of such person's spouse or is able to earn the means for such per-
son's spouse [sic] support and wilfully abandons and leaves such per-
son's spouse in a destitute condition; or who refuses or neglects to pro-
vide such person's spouse with necessary food, clothing, shelter, or
medical attendance, unless the abandonment is justified by misconduct
ters, but only minor dependent brothers were permitted to recover. However, 'in
another section dealing with payment of workmen's compensation benefits after the
death of the worker, a minority requirement was inserted for both dependent brothers
and sisters. Ch. 154, § 92, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12.080 (Supp. 1972).
The premise of the unamended laws in both cases was the same-minor brothers
were apt to be dependent, but emancipated brothers could support themselves. It was
unlikely that sisters would be able to do the same. Since both sections essentially con-
cern the same subject-payment of benefits for injury after death-there is no justifica-
tion for amending them in disparate ways. Surely, if the dependency of a brother or
sister is established, age should not be a factor in whether recovery is permitted to
survivors. For other substantive inconsistencies, see notes 38 & 39 and text accompany-
ing note 127 infra.
Unlike the technical inconsistencies in the amendments contained in chapter 154.
these substantive inconsistencies may prove troublesome. Especially where the in-
consistencies are extant in the same piece of legislation, a court or agency may have
difficulty discerning the policy considerations of the legislature, normally an important
interpretative aid. The failure of the amendments to be consistent also makes it dif-
fictilt to predit a probable lislktive reiponse to an equal rights problem.
29. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.205 (Supp. 1972).
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.20.030 (Supp. 1972). The crime is a felony if children
under the age of 16 are involved and a gross misdemeanor if they are over 16.
3 I. Id.
32. Ch. 154. § 34(l)(c), amending WASH. REV. CODE § 26.20.030(l)(c). Coin-
pare, noting the clarity of the statutory language, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-6-2 (2d
Repl. 1973).
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of the abandoned spouse, shall be guilty of the crime of family de-
sertion or nonsupport.
Ostensibly, this section now meets the requirements of the equal
rights amendment, since it has extended liability for desertion or non-
support to women. There is, however, an indication that the revised
statute has retained underlying sex role assumptions and is incon-
sistent with the reasons for proscribing desertion or nonsupport.
In the child support context, the legislature has assumed that minor
children generally are unable to adequately care for themselves, and
therefore both parents have been given the obligation not to desert de-
pendents and to provide them with "necessary" food, clothing, shelter
or medical attendanceA3 The word "necessary" is used in the same
context in the child support statute as in the spousal support statute,
and interpretations of "necessary" in the former could be held to be
authoritative in the latter.
In interpreting "necessary," the Washington court has held that
parents have a duty to support minor children regardless of the child's
actual need. For example, in a situation where a stepfather was pro-
viding for the needs of the child, the natural father argued that the
child was not "in need" and therefore, he could not be found guilty of
failure to furnish "necessary" food, clothing, shelter and medical at-
tendance.34 The Washington court refused to place such a construc-
tion on the statutory language, stating that the obligation to support,
unless affirmatively relieved by agreement of the stepfather, still ex-
isted.: 5
The language in the spousal support statute did not make it clear
whether the duty owed to the wife was the same as that owed to
children. The statute first proscribed abandoning a wife and leaving
her "in destitute condition." This seemed to imply that if the wife was
33. Ch. 154. § 3411)(a)-(b), amending WASH. REV. CODE § 26.20.030(l)(a)-
(b). The obligation extends independently to both parents and stepparents with the
proviso that the stepparent's obligation ceases at termination of the marriage.
34. State v. Brown, 52 Wn. 2d 92, 323 P.2d 23911958).
35. Id. at 94, 323 P.2d at 241. The stepfather did not relieve the father of the
duty merely by furnishing support. Accord, State v. Ozanne. 75 Wn. 2d 546. 452 P.2d
745 (1969). where the mother was furnishing minimal support for the children. How-
ever, an affirmative undertaking by the wife to release the husband from the duty is a
defense. State v. Tucker, 151 Wash. 218. 275 P. 558 ( 1929).
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not actually in need, this crime could not have been committed. How-
ever, the statute also uses the same language as that found in the sec-
tion concerning child support-it is a crime to refuse or neglect to
provide "necessary" food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance for
a wife. If "necessary" in the spousal support statute is read in the same
manner as "necessary" in the child support statute, the result would
have been to require support of a wife who was fully able to care for
herself, or who was cared for by some third party.:3"
The spousal support section, as originally drafted, merely ex-
pressed the sex role realities of the time.37 Wives and children were
supported by husbands. Where the husband was unable to support his
children, the wife had an obligation to do the best she could. Funda-
mental attitudes toward children have not changed, : 8 nor have the
36. Two cases among the few reported involving a prosecution for failure to sup-
port a wife where children were not also involved illustrate attitudes of another era
and probably are not indicative of the approach which could be expected from a
contemporary court. For example, in State v. McPherson, 72 Wash. 371, 130 P. 481
(1913), a 16-year-old husband was convicted for failure to support his 17-year-old
pregnant wife. The defendant had sent his wife home to her mother and thereafter
failed to contribute to her support. Defendant testified that his nine dollar weekly sal-
ary as a clerk was insufficient to support his wife. The court stated:
His confession of his inability to support his wife is not to his credit. It shows a
moral cowardice few young men would confess. The prosecuting attorney very
pertinently asked him if he was the only married clerk in the city.
Id. at 374, 130 P. at 482-83. The court determined that the wife was "in need" even
though she was living with her parents. See also State v. Bracking, 82 Wash. 385, 144
P. 530 (1914), sustaining a conviction on the basis of evidence that the wife was
"without funds" and the defendant husband was "able-bodied, healthy, and strong,
and had an office in the Globe Building in Seattle."
37. The assumption that women are unable to support themselves is an offshoot
of the more general sex role concept that men are the breadwinners and women take
care of the home and are supported. For the influence this sex role notion has in the
drafting and administration of welfare statutes, see Goldberg & Hale, The Equal
Rights Amendment and the Administration of Income Assistance Programs in New
Mexico, 3 N. MEX. L. REV. 84 (1973). See also Johnston, Sex and Property, The
Common Law Tradition, The Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward
Equality, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033 (1972).
38. However, ch. 154, .f 44, may represent a change in traditional attitudes
towards children. Prior to amendment, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.37.020 (1963) pro-
vided that when a mother was an "inmate of a house of ill fame" and the father was
unfit, a child could be removed from her custody. The revision, instead of establishing
a like ground for fathers, struck this ground altogether. Thus, although prostitution is
a crime, see WASH. REv. CODE § 9.87.010 (Supp. 1972), and conviction of a crime is
another ground of parental unfitness, the legislature appears to have eliminated, with-
out debate, open parental sexual misconduct as a consideration in the determination
of fitness. If the legislature regards prostitution sufficiently troublesome and unwhole-
some to provide penal sanctions, it would appear inconsistent to ignore its impact on
the growth and development of children. Conversely, and in line with the sanction
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needs of children changed. They need care, and each parent is ex-
pected to shoulder a portion of the burden to the extent of ability.39
However, fundamental attitudes concerning interspousal rights and
responsibilities have changed and are changing. The assumption that
a wife is economically helpless is not warranted and should not be the
basis for statutory revision. 0 The revision of the spousal support
section appears to follow this principle and extends the responsibility
for support to both spouses. However, the extension ignores the fact
that the underlying assumption justifying the duty to support the wife
has disappeared in many cases and rarely has existed in the case of
husbands.
At the very least, a court interpreting the revised spousal support
section should read into "necessary" some criteria of actual need with
respect to the interspousal support duty. To do otherwise will under-
mine a fundamental principle of the equal rights amendment-that
the husband and wife are equal, capable adults in a special relation-
ship. That special relationship, of course, properly can be the basis for
legislative imposition of special duties. But the legislature should first
recognize that unlike the situation involving children, in a coequal
partnership there is no general need to impose support duties at all.
Instead, the statute should be structured to reach only those situations
where there are reasons to impose such a duty. Factors such as age,
education, job skills, child care responsibilities and physical and emo-
tional condition should be considered,-' and criminal sanctions should
against prostitution, ch. 154. § 18. am1ending WASH. Ri-v. CODE § 7.48.240 (1963)
redefined "houses of ill fame" to eliminate references solely to women. Also, institu-
tions for "'reformation of fallen women" were removed from tax-exempt status.
Ch. 154. § 119. amending WAsh. REV. CODE § 84.36.040. (Supp. 1972).
39. There are no reported prosecutions of women for nonsupport. This. inter-
estingly enough. may represent an underlying recognition that the woman (mother)
is making an economic contribution to the family by providing home and child care
services. Generally she is not expected to provide these services and have gainful out-
of-home employment. See Goldberg & Hale. The Equal Rights Amendment and the
Administration of Ilncoze As.sistance Prograns in New Mexico, 3 N. MEX. L. REV.
84(1973).
40. 63.114 of all women workers in 1972 were married (58.5 i married, hus-
band present: 4.6% married, husband absent). U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR. WOMEN'S
BUREAU. WHY WOMEN WORK. BULLETIN (June 1973).
41. A helpful comparison and guideline may be found in the recently passed
divorce law with respect to standards for awarding maintenance to parties to a
divorce. See ch. 157. § 9. 119731 Wash. Laws. WAsii. REV. CODE § 26.09.090 (Supp.
1973). Governor Evans vetoed §§ 30-33 of ch. 154 because they conflicted with the
new divorce laws by duplicating, with sex neutral changes. the old divorce provisions.
Spousal misconduct has not been treated in the same manner from revision to re-
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be imposed only where those factors leave one of the spouses incap-
able of his or her own support. Consideration of such factors can also
minimize the "transition problems" faced by society while many
women are still economically dependent as well as accommodate the
personal preference of either spouse to remain in an economically
dependent role.42 If the policy and assumptions underlying the spousal
support statute had been more carefully considered in light of equal
rights principles, the statute would have been completely rewritten
rather than merely extended to cover both sexes.
B. Third Party Transactions
As a result of a legislative attempt to implement equal rights be-
tween the sexes m3 the laws governing the rights and responsibilities of
spouses with respect to marital property44 underwent significant
changes prior to the passage of Chapter 154. Thus, Chapter 154 did
not amend any statutes dealing directly with marital property. It did,
however, amend certain miscellaneous statutes concerning the rela-
tionship of third parties to property belonging to the marital commu-
nity or one of its members. Unfortunately, the amendments contained
in Chapter 154 do not adequately reflect the policies demonstrated by
the 1972 community property amendments, and when considered
with them, fail to provide a coherent guide for third parties attempting
to deal with marital property.
Marital property laws characterize and vest management rights in
vision. It is a ground justifying abandonment or failure to support, ch. 154, § 34,
aimending WASH. REV. CODE § 26.20.030 (Supp. 1972), and for denying beneficiary
status to the surviving spouses of injured workers, ch. 154, § 91, amending WASH.
REV. CODE § 51.08.020 (1963). However, recently passed revisions in the divorce law
forbid consideration of misconduct in determining marital property rights or main-
tenance. Although there may be some justification for retaining spousal misconduct as
a defense in the criminal context, there is little reason to retain it in the beneficiary
situation when it has been generally eliminated in the treatment of marital
property.
42. The spouse assuming home or child care responsibilities should be recognized
as making an economic contribution to the support of the family. See generally
REPORT OF THE MARRIAGE AND FAMILY COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION
FOR WOMEN. SUGGESTED GUIDELINES IN STUDYING AND COMMENTS ON THE UNIFORM
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 2 (197 ).
43. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.16 (Supp. 1972).
44. The term marital property is used in this article to describe all of the property
owned by a husband and wife regardless of whether the property is separate or
community.
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that property for several purposes. The purpose of primary import-
ance to an ongoing marital relationship is to define the rights of third
parties, particularly creditors, in marital property. There are basically
three types of marital property to be considered by creditors of a hus-
band and wife: the community property, the husband's separate prop-
erty and the wife's separate property. Actions of each spouse involving
his or her separate property are sufficient to bind that property. Prior
to the 1972 amendments, the husband's actions presumptively bound
the community, but the wife's did not since she lacked power of man-
agement and control. In certain instances, however, the wife could
obligate the community property, as well as her husband's separate
property, by her actions. 45 The husband, on the contrary, was not
able to bind the wife's separate property by his actions.4 6
The 1972 amendments, by conferring coequal management power
in community property on both spouses, made an important change in
this situation. 47 As Professor Cross analyzes the impact of this statutory
change, either spouse may obligate all of the community, but neither
can bind the separate property of the other, since the basis for the
wife's authority to bind her husband's separate property has disap-
peared .48
At first glance the changes made in Chapter 154 merely implement
the equalization concepts contained in the community property
amendments. For instance, R.C.W. § 6.16.070 has been changed to
provide that the real and personal estate of any married person, as
well as his or her personal earnings, are exempt from execution or at-
tachment upon any liability or judgment against the other spouse.",
However, this section does more than exempt the separate property of
45. Cross. lqualitv.lor Spou.es in Washington Connumnity Properly Law---1972
Statutoryv Changes, 48 WASH. L. REV. 527 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Cross]. The
wife could bind the community, as well as the husband's separate property. under two
theories: (1) That she acted as agent for the husband: or (2) that the husband had
an affirmative duty to control her actions. Id. at 549.
46. Id. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 6.16.070(1963).
47. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(Supp. 1972).
48. Cross, sttprat note 45, at 549.
49. Ch. 154, § 14. anending Wash. Rev. Code § 6.16.070 (1963). The section
provides:
All real and personal estate belonging to any married person at the time of his or
her marriage, and all which he or she may have acquired subsequently to such
marriage, or to which he or she shall hereafter become entitled in his or her own
right, and all his or her personal earnings, and all the issues, rents and profits of
such real estate, shall be exempt from attachment and execution upon any liability
or judgment against the other spouse, so long as he or she or any minor heir of
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a spouse from enforcement of a judgment against the other spouse; it
exempts community property in the form of earnings as well.
The inconsistency is traceable. R.C.W. § 26.16.130, one of the
community property sections repealed in 1971, provided: "A wife
may receive the wages of her personal labor, and maintain an action
therefor in her own name and hold the same in her own right ...."
The exemption of a wife's personal earnings from execution formerly
found in R.C.W. § 6.16.070 was tied to this general statement of a
woman's right to control her own earnings, something she could not
do when she had no management rights in the community since her
earnings were community property. Additionally, the exemption coin-
cided with the general theory of limited liability-where there is lim-
ited control there is a justifiable reason for limited liability. 50 Surely,
with the advent of equal management powers in community property
earnings, the reason for this earnings exemption has disappeared and
it should not have been perpetuated and extended in the amendment
to R.C.W. § 6.16.070.' Again, merely extending the statute without
considering its underlying policy assumptions has resulted in an inade-
quate revision.
Another variance from what appears to be the policy underlying the
marital property statutes appears in the revision of the code sections
dealing with the right to isolate and manner of isolating homestead
property from creditors. "2 A recognized danger in conferring equal
his or her body shall be living: PROVIDED, That the separate property of each
spouse shall be liable for debts owing by him or her at the time of marriage.
50. Cf. Marsh v. Fisher, 69 Wash. 570, 125 P. 951 (1912). The court in con-
sidering an exemption for the earnings of a married woman could not resolve the in-
consistency to its satisfaction. The court stated that the earnings of a married woman
are not exempt if they are community property, but only if they are separate property,
losing sight of the fact that the wife's community property earnings were exempt
because she could not control them.
51. Ch. 154, § 14, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 6.16.070 (1963). This exemp-
tion may make little practical difference. Since each spouse always acts for the
community, any judgment against the acting spouse would probably be a joint one
against both spouses and not a "liability or judgment against the other spouse." Hence,
the exemption may never come into play. However, the above analysis does rest on
the assumption that the acting spouse is always acting for the community and never
with respect to separate property alone. Such a presumption probably cannot be made
in transactions where participation of the other spouse is required by statute. See
Cross, slpra note 45, at 536.
52. Ch. 154, § 6, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 6.12.020 (1963); § 7, amending
WASH. REV. CODE § 6.12.030 (1963); § 8, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 6.12.040
(1963); § 9, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 6.12.060 (1963); § 10, amending WASH.
REV. CODE § 6.12.260 (1963); § 11, anending WASH. REV. CODE § 6.12.290 (1963).
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management power on both spouses is the possibility that they will
take inconsistent actions, either deliberately or inadvertently. The re-
vision of the general community property statutes took this possibility
into account and provided that participation of both spouses was re-
quired for certain transactions.5 3 In another area of possible conflict,
the acting spouse was restricted to disposition of no more than one
half of the total community property by his or her actions. 54 However,
Chapter 154, in revising R.C.W. § 6.12.020 et seq., failed to foreclose
the possibility of inconsistent actions by the respective spouses.55
A related but more general aspect of the legislature's failure to de-
velop a consistent theory of third party relations with marital property
is demonstrated by the various revisions of married women's property
statutes.5" These, like many other sections, were merely extended to
include males. For example, a section that formerly permitted a mar-
ried woman to transfer stock standing in her own name without the
consent of her husband 57 was amended to permit any person to
transfer stock without the consent of his or her spouse.5 8 It is ex-
tremely difficult to justify extension, rather than repeal, of statutes
whose primary purpose was to remove the coverture disabilities of a
married woman. First, there is no longer a need for statutes to remove
disabilities from married women; 5: both the equal rights amendment
and the management power over community property have removed
any doubt concerning the current existence of such disabilities. Addi-
tionally, by extending such statutes to both spouses the legislature runs
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(2)-(5) (Supp. 1972).
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(l) (Supp. 1972). Prior to the 1972 amend-
ments, participation was required for some transactions and restrictions were placed
on donative transactions. However. the primary purpose of those requirements prior
to the extension of coequal management powers was to protect the wife. rather than
to prevent inconsistent actions.
55. The statute describing the effect of declarations of homestead was unclear
before ch. 154, § 6. amending WASH. REV. CODE § 6,12.020 (1963) was enacted. See
Treadwell & Shulkin. Joint Tenanc)-Creditor-Debtor Relation.%, 37 WASH. L. REV.
58, 68 (1962). The revision, by inserting language to make the sections sex neutral.
has compounded this confusion.
56. Ch. 154. § 22, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 19.72.030 (1963): § 23, anend-
iln WAsI. REV. (ODE § 23A.08.310( 1963): § 48.anendingWAsH. REV.CODE § 30.08.150
(1963). § 49. (aMlendilg WASH. REV. COD.i § 30.20.030 (1963): § 50. amending WASH.
Riv. CODE § 33.20.050 (1963).
57. WASH. RE v. CODE § 23A.08.3 10 (Supp. 1972).
58. Ch. 154, § 23. amending WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.3 10 (1963).
59. The legislature appears to have recognized this in at least one instance by re-
pealing rather than extending the code section permitting a married woman to enter
into contracts. Ch. 154, § 121(3). repealing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.170 (1963).
586
Vol. 49: 571, 1974
Washington's ERA
the risk of conflicts, such as those previously noted, with the general
marital property statutes.
The 1972 revision of the community property statutes represents a
legislative decision that community property laws will no longer be
based on the single view that the husband is the breadwinner and
manager, and the wife is the housekeeper and child raiser."0 Where
husband and wife both desire to exercise management of marital
property, they may do so. However, it is important that third parties
confronted with coequal management powers have clearly defined
expectations with respect to marital property. Such individuals and
institutions cannot be expected to deal fairly and nondiscriminator-
ilyI" with married persons in the absence of careful legislative formula-
tion of the parties' rights and responsibilities.
C. Survivor's Benefits
Numerous sections of Chapter 154 amend statutes that provide
survivor's benefits to widows and children. The amendments reach
survivor's benefits in several different contexts. Pension funds," 2 in-
dustrial instrance"3 and employee benefits of common carriers"4 and
public utilities"5 have been changed to provide that the surviving
60. Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, The Law School
Curricthtun, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033, 1090 (1972).
61. See generally Ellis, Equal Rights and the Debt Provisions of New Mexico
Comnmnutnity Property Law, 3 N. MEX. L. REV. 57 (1973). The Legislature has pro-
hibited discrimination in real estate, insurance and credit transactions on the basis of
marital status or sex. Ch. 141, [1973] Wash. Laws, amending WASH. REV. CODE ch. 49.60
(1963 & Supp. 1972). Delineation of the rights of third parties with respect to marital
property would be a great aid in combating such discrimination.
62. See amendments to statutory pension funds cited in note 20 supra (firemen's
retirement). See also, ch. 154, § 76. amending WASH. REV. CODE § 41.32. 520 (1l63);
§ 77, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 41.33.020 (1963) (teachers' retirement); § 78,
amending WASH. REV. CODE § 41.44.170 (1963); § 79, amending WASH. REV. CODE §
41.44.210 (1963) (city employees' retirement); § I, amending WASH. REV. CODE §
2.12.030 (Supp. 1972) (judges' retirement).
63. Ch. 154, § 91, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.020 (1963); § 92, amend-
ing WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12.080 (Supp. 1972); § 93, amending WASH. REV. CODE §
51.24.010 (Supp. 1972); § 94, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.020 (1963); §§
95-96, amending WASH. REV. CODE §§ 5 1.32.040-.050 (Supp. 1972); § 97, amend-
ig WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.070 (Supp. 1972); and § 98, amending WASH. REV. CODE
§ 51.32.135 (1963).
64. Ch. 154, § 117, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 81.28.080 (1963); § 118,
amending WASH. REV. CODE § 81.94.060 (1963).
65. Ch. 154, § 116, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 80.28.080 (1963). The old
soldier's home is now open to spouses of all service personnel (ch. 154, § 102,
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spouse, rather than just the widow, may receive the respective benefits
after the death of the employee.
In most instances, these changes merely clarify that widowers, as
well as widows, are entitled to survivor's benefits. However, in several
instances the changes make a substantive difference. For example, the
teacher's retirement fund previously permitted payment to a surviving
widow, but not to a surviving widower unless he was dependent.""
Chapter 154 has amended this section to permit payment of benefits
to a widower regardless of dependency." 7
Disparity in treatment of widows and widowers under prior statutes
was common. 8 This disparity reflected two underlying assumptions:
(1) That a widow is usually dependent on the deceased for support;
and (2) that survivor's benefits should be available only where depend-
ency exists.' : The first assumption, although still valid as a general
proposition, is not always the case, and in the years to come, as in-
creasing numbers of women enter and remain in various occupations,
will become less valid. The second assumption, interestingly enough,
appears to have been discarded by the drafters of Chapter 154 who
amending WASH. REV. CODE § 72.36.040 (1963); § 103, amending WASH. REV.
CODE § 72.36.050 (1963): § 104, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 72.36.080 (1963)),
and veteran's compensation for service in World War II and the Korean Conflict is
available to surviving spouses (ch. 154, § 108, amending WASH. REV. CODE §
73.32.020 (1963); §§ 109-10, amending WASH. REV. CODE §§ 73.33.010-.020
(1963)).
66. WAsH. REV. CODE § 41.32.520 (1963).
67. This particular change may have produced an interesting conflict. The
teacher's retirement system is tied to the federal old age and survivor's insurance pro-
gram administered by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the
joint participation agreement provides that the terms and conditions of the teacher's
retirement plan are to be construed in conformity with the federal Social Security Act
42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970). The Social Security Act contains a requirement that a
widower, to receive survivor's benefits. must be dependent on the insured wife for at
least one-half of his support. Id. § 402(c) (1970). Consequently, there is potential
conflict between the Social Security Act and the amended survivor's benefit sections
of the teacher's retirement system that could nullify this amendment. Dependency re-
quirements for widowers (the widower had to be an "invalid") were also removed
from several sections providing workmen's compensation benefits. Ch. 154. § 96.
amending WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.050 (Supp. 1972): § 97. amending WASH. REV.
CODE § 51.32.070 (Supp. 1972).
68. Under many statutes, the husband must be dependent in order to qualify for
benefits earned through the wife's occupation, although the same benefits are extended
to the wife of a male employee without regard to the actual dependency of the wom-
an. The dependency test for husbands, but not wives, has been disapproved as a
criterion for receiving military benefits. Frontiero v. Richardson. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
69. This latter assumption is characteristic of many statutes that provide sur-
vivor's benefits, particularly in the case of children, parents. brothers and sisters. See,
e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060(1963).
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have uniformly extended survivor's benefits to spouses regardless of
dependency.
This extension, of course, is not the only way to conform survivor's
benefits to the equal rights amendment. The available alternative is
restriction of benefits to surviving spouses, regardless of sex, who were
dependent on the deceased for support. The legislative decision should
be made after consideration of several factors, including the cost to em-
ployers to provide benefits to nondependent survivors and the eco-
nomic impact on married persons. Generally speaking, pensions do
not provide living income to retired individuals. The sudden loss of
one pension, even if his or her own pension remains, could be a severe
economic blow to the surviving spouse. On the other hand, removal of
a dependency test converts the pension into a form of property similar
to other property that may be inherited as a matter of right, regardless
of need.70
IV. EMPLOYMENT
Chapter 154 ostensibly opened several occupations to women that
previously were closed. Women may now be the chief or deputy mine
inspector of the State,7' work in mines,72 cut men's hair as cosmeti-
cians, 73 hold liquor licenses 74 and be members of the corps for conser-
vation.75 However, these occupations were probably already available
70. The subject of pensions and survivor's benefits is a complex one, in need of
careful legislative consideration in this time of rapidly changing economic and social
conditions. Varying theories and ideas on the topic are represented in the several bills
for comprehensive pension legislation now pending in Congress. Although the passage
of the equal rights amendment can serve as an effective goad to consider needed
changes, a broader view than mere equalization should be taken by the legislature in
its decision making process.
The most important of the approximately 70 bills introduced in 1973 concerning
pension plan reform are H.R. 2, H.R. 462, H.R. 7157. S. 4 and S. 1631, 93d Cong. Ist
Sess. (1973).
71. Ch. 154, §§ 80-81, amending WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.22.160-.170 (1963).
72. Ch. 154, § 114, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 78.40.606 (1963).
73. Ch. 154, § 21, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 18.18.010(1963).
74. Ch. 154, § 100, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 67.14.040 (1963). There is,
however, no evidence that women were ever denied liquor licenses in Washington
even though WASH. REV. CODE § 67.14.040 (1963) formerly required an applicant for
a license to be a "man of good moral character." See I1 WASH. AD. CODE. ch. 314-12
(Supp. 10A 1972).
75. Ch. 154, § 85, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 43.51.570 (1963).
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to women following the passage in 1963 of general legislation which
provided:7"
[H] ereafter in this state every avenue of employment shall be open to
women; and any business, vocation, profession and calling followed
and pursued by men may be followed and pursued by women...
This statute was passed subsequent to the occupational statutes
amended by Chapter 154 and would no doubt have been held to su-
percede these occupational statutes had they been challenged.
Chapter 154 also made two changes in the employment context
that could be harmful to women as well as men. Rather than ex-
tending maximum hours legislation to men, 77 the provision protecting
women was repealed.78 Additionally, the position of "supervisor of
women in industry" in the Department of Labor and Industries, pre-
viously reserved for a female, was eliminated. 79
Opinion is divided as to whether state protective labor legislation
applicable only to women, such as wages and hours laws, may be ex-
tended by courts to men or whether such legislation must be invali-
dated because it conflicts with the anti-sex discrimination provisions
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.80 An identical issue is
presented by protective labor legislation considered in conjunction
with the equal rights amendment. Unlike the courts, the Legislature
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.12.200 (Supp. 1972).
77. Certain minimum wage legislation currently applies to all working persons re-
gardless of sex. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 49.46 (1963). Notice, however, that many of
the administrative orders on minimum wages apply only to women and minors.
10 WASH. AD. CODE ch. 296-128 (Supp. 9, 1971). and that there are special statutory
wage provisions applicable only to women and minors that were not repealed. WASH.
REV. CODE § 49.12.020 (1963).
78. Ch. 154, § 121(4), repealing WASH. REv. CODE § 49.28.070(1963).
79. Ch. 154. §§ 82-84, amending WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.22.260-.280 (1963).
It is not entirely clear that the position was eliminated. It is possible to interpret the
change as merely eliminating the requirement that the supervisor of women in in-
dustry be a woman, since one reference to the position is retained in § 84 though all
other references have been struck.
80. Compare Hays v. Potlatch Forests. Inc., 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972). wiith
Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 325 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Pa. 1971). Professor
Kanowitz argues that where the regulatory statute is beneficial, it should be extended
to cover men. L. KANOWITZ. supra note 13, at 120-24. The fact that coerced over-
time is a significant worry of employees is indicated by the fact that voluntary over-
time was a major bargaining issue in the recently negotiated contract between
Chrysler Corp. and the U.A.W. N.Y. Times. Sept. 19. 1973. at 77. col. 2 (city ed.).
590
Vol. 49: 571, 1974
Washington's ERA
clearly can make the choice to protect all employees, not just women,
from coerced overtime work. Amending maximum hours legislation
by extending coverage to men appears to be preferable to repealing
the legislation, since it permits the individual to decide whether or
not to work overtime and distributes available work among more per-
sons in the labor market.81
The elimination of the position of "supervisor of women in indus-
try" in the Department of Labor and Industries is unfortunate. One
real handicap in the drive for equal rights for women in employment
has been the lack of a systematic data gathering agency focusing on
the whole range of women's problems. 82 The position eliminated
could have accomplished this function, at least in the employment
context. The statutory language consigning the position to a woman
need not have been a stumbling block; the position could have been
retained without the proviso that it be filled by a woman. The better
alternative, however, would have been to retain the position as stated
since there is ample support in affirmative action concepts for the re-
quirement. 8:3 Certainly, until the problems of women in industry coin-
cide more closely with those of men, there is need for a voice on their
behalf in the Department of Labor and Industries.
Chapter 154 has made an unusual change in the veteran's employ-
81. A revision of the entire chapter. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 49.12 (1963), now
covering "Female and Child Labor" and not affected by chapter 154, was introduced
as S.S.B. 2463. 43rd Leg. 2d Ex. Sess. The Bill, which has not passed, would extend
protective legislation to nearly all workers. (Subsequent to the placing of this article
into the production process. the Bill was passed, ch. 16. [1973] Wash. Laws 2d Ex.
Sess.)
82. Mink, Federal Legislation to End Discrimination Against Women, 5 VAL.
L. REV. 397, 407 (1971).
83. Exec. Order No. 1,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (Supp. 1965), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1970), as amended Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (Supp. 1970), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1970). permits cancellation of government contracts where the contractor
discriminates on the basis of sex. In addition, the Office of Federal Contract Com-
pliance has issued regulations under the executive order to require contractors to
establish goals and timetables to redress imbalance in the sex composition of the
work force. 41 C.F.R. ch. 60-2 (Supp. 1973). The Department of Health. Education,
and Welfare has issued similar affirmative action guidelines for educational institu-
tions holding government contracts. The famous "Philadelphia Plan" for redressing
racial imbalance has been upheld in Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of
Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971). See also Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279
F.Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). which ordered action to remedy the present effect of
past discrimination in a seniority system.
591
Washington Law Review
ment preference statute. The prerevision statute gave honorably dis-
charged soldiers, sailors and marines and their widows preference for
appointment and employment "[i]n every public department, and
upon all public works of the state. ... 4 The revised version of the
statute gives the same preference not just to veterans and their sur-
viving spouses, but to the "spouses" of veterans.8 5 Obviously, the ex-
tension of preference to spouses, regardless of whether the veteran is
living or dead, greatly increases the number of persons entitled to civil
service favoritism and could mean that a veteran and his or her spouse
who were both working would gain a double economic advantage for
the actual military service of only one of them. It is difficult to believe
that the legislature intended such a result.
V. SEX RELATED CRIMES
Current sex roles in our society have heavily influenced the tradi-
tional legal response to sex crimes. Most frequently this has resulted in
protecting only women in rape, statutory rape and seduction situa-
tions.18 Conversely, typically only women are penalized for prostitu-
tion 7 while the crime of patronizing a prostitute frequently goes un-
sanctioned or unprosecuted. The double standard and the historic
male duty to protect women were partially responsible for this dis-
parity; the possibility of pregnancy was also a factor. On the other
hand, even young men, the law assumed, were able to make intelligent
choices concerning sexual relations, and of course, could not become
pregnant as a result of sexual activity.
The double standard and laws protecting helpless women are still
very much with us, and render any revision of criminal laws re-
specting sex an explosive and controversial subject. In order to avoid
controversy, revisors often choose perfunctorily to equalize sex crime
statutes by the adoption of sex neutral language, although extensive
reform was and is necessary. 88
84. WASH. REV. CODE § 73.16.010 (1963).
85. Ch. 154, § 107, amnending WASH. REV. CODE § 73.16.010(1963).
86. L. KANOWITZ, suipra note 13, at 18-25. See also K. MILLETT, supra note 14,
at 44.
87. L. KANOWITZ, supra note 13, at 15. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010 (Supp.
1972).
88. Compare ch. 154, § 122-29, amending WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.79.010-.080
(1963). With JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE WASHINGTON LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.
REVISED WASHINGTON CRIMINAL CODE ch. 9A.44 (Tent. Draft 1972).
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A. Rape
The law historically has treated violent sexual assault against a
woman as a serious crime, although such treatment probably reflects
the historical position of women in society more than a general con-
cern over the serious nature of sexual assault itself. Because of the
doctrine of coverture at common law, a married woman was virtually
the property of her husband.8 9 Therefore, rape of a married woman
was not only a personal violation of the woman, but a violation of her
husband's marital and property rights as well. :"0 For an unmarried
woman, loss of virginity was a serious impediment to marriage, which
until recently was the only feasible future for most women. Rape was
also an affront to the fathers, brothers and other male kinfolk charged
with the protection of unmarried females. The preoccupation of rape
laws with the chastity of the female victim furnishes additional evi-
dence that factors other than the seriousness of sexual assault itself
were at work."'
Rape was formerly defined by R.C.W. § 9.79.010 as "an act of
sexual intercourse with a female not the wife of the perpetrator
against her will and without her consent." This statute established the
three elements of rape: sexual intercourse, force, and lack of consent."2
89. L. KANOWITZ, supra note 13, at 35-40.
90. L. KANOWITZ, supra note 13, at 18-25. See also K. MILLET, supra note 14,
at 44.
91. Chastity of the victim is an element of the offense in several sex crimes. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.070 (1963) (seduction); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.080
(1963) (indecent liberties, exposure). Prior acts of sexual misconduct are generally ad-
missible on the issue of consent. Cf. State v. Severns, 13 Wn. 2d 542, 125 P.2d 659 (1942).
While arguably relevant, such testimony is highly prejudicial and is especially un-
necessary where the assault is corroborated by other physical evidence of attack.
Even so, such an eminent authority as Dean Wigmore suggested that "In)o judge
should ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's
social history and mental makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified
physician." 3 J. WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 924a (3d ed. 1940) (original in italics), as
quoted in Weihofen, Victims in Criminal Violence, 8 J. PUB. L. 209, 211 (1959).
Weihofen himself advocates stricter standards for admission of the testimony of
female victims of crime than for other crime victims, Cf. Comment, The Victim in a
Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, II AM.J. CRIM. L. 335 (1973).
Current information on the reporting and prosecution of rape also reveals the ex-
tent to which sex roles operate in police and judicial handling of this crime. The
F.B.I. reports that "this offense is probably one of the most under-reported crimes
due primarily to fear andlor embarrassment on the part of victims . . ." and that
prosecutions are "frequently complicated by a prior relationship between victim and
offender." F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 13-14 (1972). See also Comment, Rape
and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919 (1973).
92. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.010 (1963).
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Rape could also be committed when the victim's informed consent
was impossible because of insanity, narcotic or alcoholic influences, or
ignorance of the nature of the act. The act of intercourse is considered
"against the will" when resistance is forcibly overcome or when resist-
ance is "prevented by fear of immediate and great bodily harm" rea-
sonably believed by the victim to follow in the event of resistance." 3
It is helpful to note first that, consistent with the equal rights
amendment, rape could be retained as a crime against women only.
Essentially, this would represent a determination on the part of the
legislature that a unique physical part of the female anatomy, the va-
gina, :14 deserves special legal protection against assault. Such a deter-
mination would also be consistent with the crime as understood in the
context of current male-female sex roles.: 5
However, our legislature has not made such a determination.
Chapter 154 revises R.C.W. § 9.79.0 10 to broaden the crime of rape
by substituting the word "person" for female and making other appro-
priate changes to extend protection to both sexes."'"3 The statute now
recognizes as a crime the rape of a male by a female. While such a
crime may be difficult to imagine because of male physical character-
istics, a female forcibly overcoming an objecting, nonconsenting male
is probably not beyond the realm of possibility. More important, how-
ever, the elements of rape include sexual intercourse where informed
consent is not possible because of insanity, narcotic or alcoholic influ-
ences or ignorance of the nature of the act. It is not at all difficult to
posit a situation where a female accomplishes sexual intercourse with
a male incapable of informed consent for one of these reasons. The
93. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.010(3) (1963).
94. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman. The Equal Rights Amendment: A Con-
stitutional Basis jor Equal Rights fir Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871. 955 (1971). But -we
Note, Sex Discrimination and the Criminal Law: The Effect of the Equal Right.%
Amendment, I I Aa,. CRIM. L. REV. 469. 480 (1973).
95. The male is typically the aggressor, the female the passive partner. K. MIL-
LETT. supra note 14. at 44: Comment. Forcible Rape and Statutory Rape: Anl Ex-
ploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE LJ. 55
(1952). Frequently repeated male justifications for actual forcible rape also shed
some light on the nature and operation of aggressive-passive sex roles in the context
of this crime. One common myth is that all women secretly want to be raped. Griffin.
Rape: the All-Anerican Crime, RAMPARTS. Sept., 1971, at 26. Yet another contends
that women "ask for it" or "deserve it" because of the places they go or the kind of
clothes they wear. Amir, Victim Precipitated Forcible Rape, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
493 (1967): Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advocate's Analysis of Corrobo-
ration. Con.sent and Character, II AM. CRIM. L. REV. 309 (1973).
96. Ch. 154. § 122, (Ianending WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.010 (1963).
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legislature has recognized this possibility and extended the protection
of rape laws to men.
It is arguable that homosexual rape is not included in the section as
revised. If so, rape is still being treated as a serious crime for historical
reasons and not because of a concern with the seriousness of sexual
assault itself. Therefore, underlying sex role assumptions have been
partially preserved in the revision even though a perfunctory equaliza-
tion has been accomplished by protecting males from rape by females.
Despite the use of the sexually neutral wbrd "person" in the revi-
sion, a reading of the statutory definitions applicable to rape and the
companion statutory sections involving sex crimes indicates that hom-
osexual rape is not proscribed by the rape statute. Initially, it is impor-
tant to note that the statutes penalizing various sex crimes distinguish
between "sexual intercourse" and "carnal knowledge." The rape
statute prohibits only sexual intercourse. The statutes do not define
either sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in anatomical terms, but
rather in terms of the nature of the act: "[a] ny sexual penetration,
however slight, is sufficient to complete sexual intercourse or carnal
knowledge.": 7
The cases discussing this definition do, however, make helpful ana-
tomical distinctions. In the context of sexual intercourse, penetration
is defined to mean that the sexual organ of the male entered and pene-
trated the sexual organ of the female.- 8 Penetration is defined differ-
ently in the context of sodomy!1: which prohibits "carnal knowledge"
of any male or female person by the anus or with the mouth or
tongue. In a sodomy prosecution involving a male and a female child,
penetration was held to mean that the mouth or tongue penetrated the
female genitals. 00 Further, in a sodomy prosectuion against two
males, the crime was deemed to have been committed "whether the
97. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.030(1963).
98. It can be assumed that the court was referring to the penis when it used the
term "sexual organ of the male." Entering the labia and vulva of the female was suf-
ficient.. State v. Snyder, 199 Wash. 298. 91 P.2d 570 (1939).
99. "Every person . . . who shall carnally know any male or female person by
the anus or with the mouth or tongue; or who shall voluntarily submit to such carnal
knowledge . . . shall be guilty of sodomy .... ." WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.100
(1963). Thus, the perpetrator of homosexual rape is guilty of sodomy.
100. Penetration is also relevant for distinguishing between indecent liberties and
sodomy. Penetration of the female sexual organs by the tongue is required for
sodomy but not for indecent liberties. State v. Olsen, 42 Wn. 2d 733, 258 P.2d 810
(1953).
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genital organ of the one or the other be advanced or received, or
whether the anus or the mouth of the one or the other be used."' 0'
Consequently, it appears that the term "carnal knowledge" encom-
passes unnatural sex acts,' 02 while the term "sexual intercourse" is re-
stricted to male-female sex acts of the traditional variety.
The amended definition of sexual intercourse found in Chapter 154
does not help resolve this problem. The revision retains the previously
mentioned definition of sexual intercourse and adds the following
definition of "sexual conduct:"103
Sexual conduct means either or both sexual intercourse or any conduct
involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of an-
other.
Initially, this definition appears in a section defining the word
"prostitution" which refers to the word "sexual conduct". Therefore, it
is arguable that the definition of sexual conduct is relevant only in the
context of prostitution. Whether or not the definition is relevant for
purposes of all sex crimes, it is significant that the definition of sexual
conduct itself distinguishes between sexual intercourse (presumably
defined in the terms just discussed) and other sex acts including homo-
sexual acts. Considering also that the word "sexual intercourse" is the
only sexual conduct sanctioned by the rape statute, this analysis con-
cludes that violent, coercive homosexual acts are penalized only by
the sodomy or indecent liberties statutes. 104
The decision to extend rape to cover the female rape of a male,
admittedly a minor social problem, but not to include homosexual
rape is a curious one.' 05 Forcible sexual attack ought to be singled out
for special treatment in the eyes of the law because it is a particularly
grievous kind of personal assault, a violation of one of the most inti-
mate portions of the human anatomy. If that consideration is, as it
should be, the reason for creating the separate, and more serious
101. Statev. Fry. 169Wash. 313,315. 13 P.2d 491, 492l1932).
102. "'Unnatural sex acts" is used herein to refer to oral and anal sex acts.
103. Ch. 154, § 124, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.030 (1963).
104. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.080 (1963). Note, however, that the commission
of an indecent liberty requires that the victim be of previoutly chaste character. See
note 113 infra for a definition of indecent liberties.
105. Natl. Inst. of Mental Health, Final Report of the Task Force on Homo-
sexuality (October I0, 1969).
106. Rape is penalized by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not less than
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crime 06 of rape rather than proscribing such conduct under the general
category of assault,107 then all persons should receive that protection
regardless of the sex of the perpetrator of the sexual assault. If failure
to proscribe homosexual rape represents the influence of historical sex
roles, true equality has not been achieved by this revision.
B. Statutory Rape
Statutory rape' 08 is qualitatively different from forcible rape. Al-
though it includes forcible rape, statutory rape also includes sex acts
that between adults would be thought of as consensual and is prem-
ised on the legal presumption that persons under certain ages are in-
capable of consenting to sexual acts.
Unlike many states, 09 Washington has, since 1919, penalized a
female person for having "sexual intercourse" with a male child under
the age of eighteen years. 10 There was, however, an apparent differ-
ence in the treatment of men and women since the same statute penal-
ized a male person who had "carnal knowledge" of any female child
under the age of eighteen years."1 The different statutory language
indicated that men and women were to be penalized for different
kinds of sexual acts with minors. It appears likely that the distinction
five years. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.010 (1963). In some states, a conviction for rape
could have carried the death penalty. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.01 (1943).
107. Assault is a lesser included offense and frequently is charged when the
prosecutor believes that a rape conviction could not be secured. See, e.g., People v.
Radunovic, 21 N.Y. 2d 186, 234 N.E.2d 212, 287 N.Y.S.2d 33, 1967).
108. Statutory rape is sometimes called, as it is in Washington, carnal knowledge.
The code section penalizing "carnal knowledge" read, prior to the revisions con-
tained in chapter 154, as follows:
Every male person who shall carnally know and abuse any female child under
the age of eighteen years, not his wife, and every female person who shall have
sexual intercourse with any male child under the age of eighteen years, not her
husband, shall be punished as follows:
(I) When such act is committed upon a child under the age of ten years, by
imprisonment in the state penitentiary for life;
(2) When such act is committed upon a child of ten years of age and under
fifteen years of age, by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than
twenty years;
(3) When such act is committed upon a child of fifteen years of age and under
eighteen years of age, by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more
than fifteen years.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.020 (1963).
109. L. KANOWITZ, supra note 13, at 19.
110. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.020 (1963).
l1. Id.
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would be drawn along the lines previously suggested for distinguishing
between sexual intercourse and carnal knowledge.
If the prior analysis is correct, in the statutory rape context, sexual
intercourse is penetration involving the male sexual organ with the
female sexual organ; carnal knowledge, on the other hand, includes
sexual penetration of the mouth or anus.'1 2 Thus, although the Wash-
ington courts have never been called upon to decide the difference, if
any, between sexual intercourse and carnal knowledge in a statutory
rape situation (for want of a reported prosecution of a female for sta-
tutory rape), it is probable that a female could not have been con-
victed for unnatural sex acts with a male under eighteen years old
pursuant to the prerevision statutory rape provisions of R.C.W. §
9.79.020.113
Chapter 154 equalizes treatment of males and females by pro-
viding that it is a crime for a male to "carnally know and abuse" a
female under the age of eighteen and a crime for a female to "carnally
know and abuse" a male under the age of eighteen.'t 4 Thus, all types
of sex acts with minor males and females are now included within the
statutory rape provisions. Since statutory rape represents a legislative
decision that sexual activity is harmful for minors under certain ages,
112. See text accompanying notes 98-102 supra.
113. However, this is not to say a female would entirely escape prosecution for
unnatural sex acts with minor males. Taking "indecent liberties" with "any child"
under the age of 15 years by "any person" is proscribed by WASH. REV. CODE §
9.79.080 (1963). The courts have declared that the term "indecent liberties" is "self-
defining." State v. Moss. 6 Wn. 2d 629, 108 P.2d 633 (1940): State v. Stuhr. I Wn. 2d
521, 96 P.2d 479 (1939). It includes exposure and touching of sexual organs and
probably is distinguished from sodomy and statutory rape by the lack of penetration.
State v. Olsen, 42 Wn. 2d 733, 258 P.2d 810 (1953). Oral and anal sex acts would
also fall within the definition of sodomy, WASH,. REV. CODE § 9.79.100 (1963) and
could be prosecuted tinder that statute. Presumably, these unnatural forms of sexual
activity by females with underage males could be penalized via these sections. How-
ever, there is a three year period, between ages 16 and 18. where it would be
impossible to invoke the stricter penalties the law regards as appropriate in the
event of sexual activity with minors. Statutory rape carries a penalty of life im-
prisonment if the child is under 10 years. not more than 20 years if the child is
between the ages of 10-15 and not more than 15 years if the child is between the
ages of 15-18. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.020 (1963). Indecent liberties with a child
Linder 15 years old carries a penalty of not more than 20 years in the state peniten-
tiary or not more than one year in the county jail. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.080
(1963). With a person over 15, however, indecent liberties is merely a gross mis-
demeanor. Sodomy carries a penalty of not more than 20 years if committed with a
child tinder 15, and not more than 10 years if committed with a person over the age
of 15. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.100 (1963). Thus, oral and anal sexual activity is
clearly not proscribed by the statutory rape provisions, although it is penalized.
without regard to consent, by the sodomy law.
114. Ch. 154. § 123, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.020 (1963).
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it is sensible to include both males and females within the protection
of the law.115 This basic decision was made in 1919 by the Wash-
ington Legislature. The current revision merely solves a definitional
problem that might have resulted in failure to include oral and anal
sex acts between a female and an underage male.
Again, however, the legislature has not included within its defini-
tions of statutory rape language that would include homosexual acts.
The revised section is clearly worded in terms of acts between a male
and a female.'This could represent a decision that the sodomy statutes
are sufficient to cover homosexual acts, although this activity, if
thought to be equally harmful for minors, would logically call for the
more severe sanctions allowable under a statutory rape prosecution.
C. Other Sex Crimes
Several other sex crimes in the State of Washington protected only
the female. These included compelling a woman to marry,' 16 abduc-
tion, 117 placing a female in a house of prostitution,' 1 8 seduction". 9
and indecent liberties with a person.over the age of 15.120 These
crimes have been extended to offer protection to males. 121 Addition-
ally, prostitution has been redefined to include homosexual acts for
purposes of the sections penalizing abduction and pimping. 22 This
extension is logical as well as necessary if the legislature wishes to re-
tain criminal sanctions for these activities. All of the above laws vio-
lated the equal rights amendment by penalizing conduct by males, but
not females, which does not rest on inherent physical differences
between the sexes. 2 3
115. L. KANOWITZ, supra note 13, at 23. But see Brown. Emerson, Falk & Freed-
man, The Equal Rights Amenmhnent: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for
Women, 80 YALE Li. 871. 959 (197 1). If it were factually determined that sexual inter-
course was physically harmful to girls under a certain age, but not to boys under the
same age, there would be justification for a distinction based on a differing physical
characteristic.
116. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.040 (1963).
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.050 (1963).
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.060 (1963).
119. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.070 (1963).
120. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.080(1) (1963).
121. Ch. 154, §§ 125-29, amending WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.79.040-.080 (1963).
122. Ch. 154, § 124, amending WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.030 (1963). See text
accompanying note 104 saprt.
123. A court that determines that the statutes violate the amendment would be
faced with the choice of striking down the law altogether or extending it to include
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It is difficult to discern the operative data used by the legislature in
extending these five crimes to protect males. Certainly, recent news
events would suggest that forced prostitution and exploitation of
males is a current phenomenon in need of attention. 24 And, if no-
thing else, the lore of shotgun weddings would justify protecting males
from compelled marriage. Whether the extant social problem of se-
duction and taking indecent liberties warrant extension of these stat-
utes, rather than repeal, is debatable. 25 To the extent there is a social
problem to be deterred by proscribing the above conduct, it seems
clear that males and females alike should be subject to the law's stric-
tures. 126
An anomaly is present in one of these five revisions. Although
R.C.W. § 9.79.070 as revised provides that either males or females
may now be guilty of the crime of seduction, Chapter 154 repealed
R.C.W. § 4.24.030 which permitted a woman to bring a civil action
for her own seduction.' 27 It seems unusual to extend the criminal
sanction for seduction but repeal the civil action rather than extend it
men, and at this juncture, would be influenced by the general principle of strict con-
struction of criminal laws. See, e.g., Seattle v. Green, 51 Wn. 2d 871. 322 P.2d 842
(1958): State v. Lewis. 46 Wn. 2d 438, 282 P.2d 297 (1955). Since criminal laws are
rarely, if ever, judicially extended to include conduct not specifically mentioned in the
statute, a court would be compelled to invalidate the statute.
The obvious question in extension of criminal laws is necessity--does the magnitude
of the social problem warrant invocation of penal sanctions? The reason courts refuse
to engage in such extension, calling it a legislative decision, is that they lack, in the
context of a single case, the ability to gather enough data to make a judgment on the
wisdom of extension. In addition, the due process rights of individuals would be vio-
lated by failure to provide notice that a particular activity is criminal.
124. Full facts have not yet been announced, but it appears that the recent Texas
mass murders are connected to organized homosexual prostitution. N.Y. Times.
August 12, 1973, at 37, cols. 3-8.
125. The reported cases under the crimes of seduction and taking indecent liberties
almost all involve children. Perhaps these statutes should be rewritten to encompass
only behavior with minors. For adults, it has been suggested that seduction has out-
lived its usefulness as a crime. See Daniels, The Inpact of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment on the New Mexico Criminal Code, 3 N. MEX. L. REV. 106. 116 (1973).
126. If instances of overcriminalization are present, they should not be allowed
to halt equal treatment. Indeed, extensions such as those described, particularly in the
area of prostitution, may focus attention on overcriminalization issues and spur other
needed reform, as well as permit reform to take place in light of the true issues rather
than be obscured by questions of equal rights and sex roles. See generally Morris.
Overcrimninalization and Washington's Revised Criminal Code, 48 WASH. L. REV. 5 (1972).
127. It is conceivable that the legislature was mindful of the difficult problem of
assessing civil damages for seduction, as well as the fact that seduction is not a modern
social problem, in its decision to eliminate the civil cause of action. However, it is
difficult to ascertain why the same considerations did not motivate the legislature to
repeal the crime of seduction, rather than extend its protection to males.
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to men, especially in light of the provision in the criminal statute that
"if at any time before judgment upon an information or indictment, a
defendant shall marry [the seduced person] ... the court shall order
all further proceedings stayed."'1 28 Prior to revision, the statute further
provided that if within three years of marriage after seduction a de-
fendant wrongfully abandoned his wife, the seduction prosecution.
could be reinstituted. 129
This portion of the seduction statute, both before and after revision,
suggests that certain stereotyped assumptions regarding sex roles un-
derlie criminalization of seduction. Loss of virginity was a serious
impediment to marriage; a woman who was not married also could
not be expected to support herself. If the seducer assumed the obliga-
tions of marriage and support, the criminal law, having provided the
necessary inducement, ceased to operate. The attempt seems not to
deter conduct so much as to encourage proper conduct after the viola-
tion has occurred.
If these considerations are eliminated, the only remaining policy
justification for criminalizing seduction seems to be the desire to en-
courage chastity. 130 Protection of chastity apparently is not worthy of
retention as a basis for a civil action, but appears to be a basis for
criminal penalties-a strange legislative judgment at best.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the absence of the kind of legislative revision represented by
Chapter 154, early implementation of the equal rights amendment
would have taken place in the courts as individuals affected by stat-
utes challenged their application on the basis of the newly passed
amendment. The courts, lacking direct legislative expression of the
impact of the amendment, would have measured the challenged
statute in light of policy considerations applicable to the particular
law, using principles of equal rights and statutory construction as a
referent. The legislature, in making direct revision of these laws,
should do no less.
128. Ch. 154, § 128, anending WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.070 (1963).
129. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.070 (1963).
130. The revisers apparently overlooked revision of one section of the criminal
code. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.58.110 (1963) makes it a misdemeanor to slander a
woman with respect to her reputation for chastity.
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The starting place for revision should be an understanding of equal
rights principles. Once their basic operation and requirements are
understood, it is possible to recognize the legislative alternatives and
intelligently choose between them. The only consistently used equal
rights formula in Chapter 154 is a principle of sex neutrality. Sex neu-
trality alone is simply not a sufficient guideline for wholesale legisla-
tive revision. It reflects a callousness to the other policies underlying
the laws being amended and invites critics of the equal rights amend-
ment to claim that their fears have been realized. 1:3'
Equal rights for the sexes, like other basic freedoms guaranteed by
the Constitutions of the United States and Washington, functions in
society, not apart from it. It is clear that sex role stereotypes, as well
as other policies related to the functioning of men and women in an
equal relationship in society, merit careful study before legislative ac-
tion is taken. The courts are fully equipped, as is the executive, to
make the interim adjustments necessary while the legislature thought-
fully revises statutes to conform to the new equal rights amend-
ment. 32
131. Opposition to the federal equal rights amendment has often been based on
claims that massive overhaul of statutes would be needed, and would have to be
accomplished so quickly it would invite errors such as have been discussed in this
article. Additionally, critics have claimed that implementation of sex neutrality would
result in absurdities that no one desires. See, e.g., Freund. The Iqual Right. Amendment
is not the Way, 6 HARV. CIv. RIGIITS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 234 (1971): Kurland. The
Iqutal Rights Amendment: Some Problems of Construction, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv.
LIB. L. REV. 243 (1971). Both Mr. Kurland and Mr. Freund testified before the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate on adoption of the equal rights
amendment.
132. There are several inexplicable changes in ch. 154 which can only be errors.
In § 66, (inmenldillg WASH. REV. CODE § 41.16.160 (1963). there is an apparent failure
to amend one use of the word "widow" to include "widower." In § 84, amending
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.22.280 (1963). "the supervisor of women in industry" was not
stricken from the text. as it should have been. In § 95. IaMetnding WASH. REV. CODE
§ 51.32.040 (Supp. 1972). some words are apparently missing after a change made.
In § 106. amending WASH. REV. CODE § 73.04.010 (1963). in changing the word
"widow" in the provision that no fee be charged a veteran for administering an oath.
the word "surviving" was not inserted before "spouse." It is not clear that this last
change is an error since the legislature may have intended to extend this benefit to
spouses of veterans regardless of whether the veteran was deceased.
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